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Abstract
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper
mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of
the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related
puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the
behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes
individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals (‘‘defectors’’), cooperative individuals
abstaining from punishment efforts (called ‘‘cooperators’’ or ‘‘second-order free-riders’’), cooperators who punish non-
cooperative behavior (‘‘moralists’’), and defectors, who punish other defectors despite being non-cooperative themselves
(‘‘immoralists’’). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting
effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of
behavioral strategies and solves the ‘‘second-order free-rider problem’’. Second, the system behavior changes its character
significantly even after very long times (‘‘who laughs last laughs best effect’’). Third, the presence of a number of defectors
can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may
profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an ‘‘unholy collaboration’’. Our findings suggest that the consideration of
punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of ‘‘moral behavior’’ by means of game-
theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains
that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors
become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.
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Introduction
Public goods such as environmental resources or social benefits
are particularly prone to exploitation by non-cooperative individ-
uals (‘‘defectors’’), who try to increase their benefit at the expense
of fair contributors or users, the ‘‘cooperators’’. This implies a
tragedy of commons [1]. It was proposed that costly punishment of
non-cooperative individuals can establish cooperation in public
goods dilemmas [2–8], and it is effective indeed [9–11].
Nonetheless, why would cooperators choose to punish defectors
at a personal cost [12–14]? One would expect that evolutionary
pressure should eventually eliminate such ‘‘moralists’’ due to their
extra costs compared to ‘‘second-order free-riders’’ (i.e. coopera-
tors, who do not punish). These, however should finally be
defeated by ‘‘free-riders’’ (defectors). To overcome this problem
[15,16], it was proposed that cooperators who punish defectors
(called ‘‘moralists’’ by us) would survive through indirect
reciprocity [17], reputation effects [18] or the possibility to abstain
from the joint enterprize [19–21] by ‘‘volunteering’’ [22,23].
Without such mechanisms, cooperators who punish will usually
vanish. Surprisingly, however, the second-order free-rider problem
is naturally resolved, without assuming additional mechanisms, if
spatial or network interactions are considered. This will be shown
in the following.
In order to study the conditions for the disappearance of non-
punishing cooperators and defectors, we simulate the public goods
game with costly punishment, considering two cooperative
strategies (C, M) and two defective ones (D, I). For illustration,
one may imagine that cooperators (C) correspond to countries
trying to meet the CO2 emission standards of the Kyoto protocol
[24], and ‘‘moralists’’ (M) to cooperative countries that addition-
ally enforce the standards by international pressure (e.g.
embargoes). Defectors (D) would correspond to those countries
ignoring the Kyoto protocol, and immoralists (I) to countries
failing to meet the Kyoto standards, but nevertheless imposing
pressure on other countries to fulfil them. According to the
classical game-theoretical prediction, all countries would finally fail
to meet the emission standards, but we will show that, in a spatial
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promote the spreading of moralists. Other well-known public
goods problems are over-fishing, the pollution of our environment,
the creation of social benefit systems, or the establishment and
maintenance of cultural institutions (such as a shared language,
norms, values, etc.).
Our simplified game-theoretical description of such problems
assumes that cooperators (C) and moralists (M) make a
contribution of 1 to the respective public good under consider-
ation, while nothing is contributed by defectors (D) and
‘‘immoralists’’ (I), i.e. defectors who punish other defectors. The
sum of all contributions is multiplied by a factor r reflecting synergy
effects of cooperation, and the resulting amount is equally shared
among the kz1 interacting individuals. Moreover, moralists and
immoralists impose a fine b=k on each defecting individual
(playing D or I), which produces an additional cost c=k per
punished defector to them (see Methods for details). The division
by k scales for the group size, but for simplicity, the parameter b is
called the punishment fine and c the punishment cost.
Given the same interaction partners, an immoralist never gets a
higher payoff than a defector, but does equally well in a
cooperative environment. Moreover, a cooperator tends to
outperform a moralist, given the interaction partners are the
same. However, a cooperator can do better than a defector when
the punishment fine b is large enough.
It is known that punishment in the public goods game and
similar games can promote cooperation above a certain critical
threshold of the synergy factor r [11,25]. Besides cooperators who
punish defectors, Heckathorn considered ‘‘full cooperators’’
(moralists) and ‘‘hypocritical cooperators’’ (immoralists) [26]. For
well-mixed interactions (where individuals interact with a
representative rather than local strategy distribution), Eldakar
and Wilson find that altruistic punishment (moralists) can spread,
if second-order free-riders (non-punishing altruists) are excluded,
and that selfish punishers (immoralists) can survive together with
altruistic non-punishers (cooperators), provided that selfish non-
punishers (defectors) are sufficiently scarce [27].
Besides well-mixed interactions, some researchers have also
investigated the effect of spatial interactions [5,11,28,29], since
it is known that they can support the survival or spreading of
cooperators [30] (but this is not always the case [31,32]). In this
way, Brandt et al. discovered a coexistence of cooperators and
defectors for certain parameter combinations [11]. Compared
to these studies, our model assumes somewhat different
replication and strategy updating rules. The main point,
however, is that we have chosen long simulation times and
scanned the parameter space more extensively, which revealed
several new insights, for example, the possible coexistence of
immoralists and moralists, even when a substantial number of
defectors is present initially. When interpreting our results
within the context of moral dynamics [33], our main discoveries
for a society facing public goods games may be summarized as
follows:
1. Victory over second-order free-riders: Over a long enough time
period, moralists fully eliminate cooperators, thereby solving
the ‘‘second-order free-rider problem’’. This becomes possible
by spatial segregation of the two cooperative strategies C and
M, where the presence of defectors puts moralists in a
advantageous position, which eventually allows moralists to
get rid of non-punishing cooperators.
2. ‘‘Who laughs last laughs best effect’’: Moralists defeat cooperators
even when the defective strategies I and D are eventually
eliminated, but this process is very slow. That is, the system
behavior changes its character significantly even after very long
times. This is the essence of the ‘‘who laughs last laughs best
effect’’. The finally winning strategy can be in a miserable
situation in the beginning, and its victory may take very long.
3. ‘‘Lucifer’s positive side effect’’: By permanently generating a
number of defectors, small mutation rates can considerably
accelerate the spreading of moralists.
4. ‘‘Unholy collaboration’’ of moralists with immoralists: Under certain
conditions, moralists can survive by profiting from immoralists.
This actually provides the first explanation for the existence of
defectors, who hypocritically punish other defectors, although
they defect themselves. The occurrence of this strange behavior
is well-known in reality and even experimentally confirmed
[34,35].
These discoveries required a combination of theoretical
considerations and extensive computer simulations on multiple
processors over long time horizons.
Results
For well-mixed interactions, defectors are the winners of the
evolutionary competition among the four behavioral strategies C,
D, M, and I [36], which implies a tragedy of the commons despite
punishment efforts. The reason is that cooperators (second-order
free-riders) spread at the cost of moralists, while requiring them for
their own survival.
Conclusions from computer simulations are strikingly different,
if the assumption of well-mixed interactions is replaced by the
more realistic assumption of spatial interactions. When coopera-
tors and defectors interact in space [5,11,37–44], it is known that
some cooperators can survive through spatial clustering [45].
However, it is not clear how the spatiotemporal dynamics and the
frequency of cooperation would change in the presence of
moralists and immoralists. Would spatial interactions be able to
Author Summary
Why do friends spontaneously come up with mutually
accepted rules, cooperation, and solidarity, while the
creation of shared moral standards often fails in large
communities? In a ‘‘global village’’, where everybody may
interact with anybody else, it is not worthwhile to punish
people who cheat. Moralists (cooperative individuals who
undertake punishment efforts) disappear because of their
disadvantage compared to cooperators who do not
punish (so-called ‘‘second-order free-riders’’). However,
cooperators are exploited by free-riders. This creates a
‘‘tragedy of the commons’’, where everybody is uncoop-
erative in the end. Yet, when people interact with friends
or local neighbors, as most people do, moralists can
escape the direct competition with non-punishing coop-
erators by separating from them. Moreover, in the
competition with free-riders, moralists can defend their
interests better than non-punishing cooperators. There-
fore, while seriously depleted in the beginning, moralists
can finally spread all over the world (‘‘who laughs last
laughs best effect’’). Strikingly, the presence of a few non-
cooperative individuals (‘‘deviant behavior’’) can accelerate
the victory of moralists. In order to spread, moralists may
also form an ‘‘unholy cooperation’’ with people having
double moral standards, i.e., free-riders who punish
non-cooperative behavior, while being uncooperative
themselves.
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second-order free-riders?
In order to explore this, we have scanned a large parameter
space. Figure 1 shows the resulting state of the system as a function
of the punishment cost c and punishment fine b after a sufficiently
long transient time. If the fine-to-cost ratio b=c and the synergy
factor r are low, defectors eliminate all other strategies. However,
for large enough fines b, cooperators and defectors are always
eliminated, and moralists prevail (Fig. 1).
At larger r values, when the punishment costs are moderate, we
find acoexistence of moralists with defectors withoutany cooperators.
To understand why moralists can outperform cooperators despite
additional punishment costs, it is important to analyze the dynamics
of spatial interactions. Starting with a homogeneous strategy
distribution (Fig. 2a), the imitation of better-performing neighbors
generatessmallclustersofindividualswithidenticalstrategies(Fig.2b).
‘‘Immoralists’’ die out quickly, while cooperators and moralists form
separate clusters in a sea of defectors (Fig. 2c). The further
development is determined by the interactions at the interfaces
between clusters of different strategies (Figs. 2d–f). In the presence of
d e f e c t o r s ,t h ef a t eo fm o r a l i s t si sn o td e c i d e db yadirect competition
with cooperators, but rather by the success of both cooperative
strategies against invasion attempts by defectors. If the b=c-ratio is
appropriate, moralists respond better to defectors than cooperators.
Indeed, moralists can spread so successfully in the presence of
defectors that areas lost by cooperators are quickly occupied by
moralists (supplementary Video S1). This indirect territorial battle
ultimately leads to the extinction of cooperators (Fig. 2f), thus
resolving the second-order free-rider problem.
In conclusion, the presence of some conventional free-riders
(defectors) supports the elimination of second-order free-riders.
However, if the fine-to-cost ratio is high, defectors are eliminated
after some time. Then, the final struggle between moralists and
cooperators takes such a long time that cooperators and moralists
seem to coexist in a stable way. Nevertheless, a very slow
coarsening of clusters is revealed, when simulating over extremely
Figure 1. Phase diagrams showing the remaining strategies in the spatial public goods game with cooperators (C), defectors (D),
moralists (M) and immoralists (I), after a sufficiently long transient time. Initially, each of the four strategies occupies 25% of the sites of the
square lattice, and their distribution is uniform in space. However, due to their evolutionary competition, two or three strategies die out after some
time. The finally resulting state depends on the synergy r of cooperation, the punishment cost c, and the punishment fine b. The displayed phase
diagrams are for (a) r~2:0, (b) r~3:5, and (d) r~4:4. (d) Enlargement of the small-cost area for r~3:5. Solid separating lines indicate that the
resulting fractions of all strategies change continuously with a modification of the model parameters b and c, while broken lines correspond to
discontinuous changes. All diagrams show that cooperators cannot stop the spreading of moralists, if only the fine-to-cost ratio is large enough.
Furthermore, there are parameter regions where moralist can crowd out cooperators in the presence of defectors. Note that the spreading of
moralists is extremely slow and follows a voter model kind of dynamics [46], if their competition with cooperators occurs in the absence of defectors.
Therefore, computer simulations had to be run over extremely long times (up to 107 iterations for a systems size of 400|400). For similar reasons, a
small level of strategy mutations (which permanently creates a small number of strategies of all kinds, in particular defectors) can largely accelerate
the spreading of moralists in the M phase, while it does not significantly change the resulting fractions of the four strategies [51]. The existence of
immoralists is usually not relevant for the outcome of the evolutionary dynamics. Apart from a very small parameter area, where immoralists and
moralists coexist, immoralists are quickly extinct. Therefore, the 4-strategy model usually behaves like a model with the three strategies C, D, and M
only. As a consequence, the phase diagrams for the latter look almost the same like the ones presented here [58].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758.g001
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are in the majority by the time the defectors disappear, while they
happen to be in the minority during the first stage of the
simulation (see Fig. 2). We call this the ‘‘who laughs last laughs best
effect’’. Since the payoffs of cooperators and moralists are identical
in the absence of other strategies, the underlying coarsening
dynamics is expected to agree with the voter model [46].
Note that there is always a punishment fine b, for which moralists
can outcompete all other strategies. The higher the synergy factor r,
the lower the b=c-ratio required to reach the prevalence of
moralists. Yet, for larger values of r, the system behavior also
becomes richer, and there are areas for small fines or high
punishment costs, where clusters with different strategies can coexist
(see Figs. 1b–d). For example, we observe the coexistence of clusters
of moralists and defectors (see Fig. 2 and supplementary Video S1)
or of cooperators and defectors (see supplementary Video S2).
Finally, for low punishment costs c but moderate punishment
fines and synergy factors r (see Fig.1d), the survival of moralists may
require the coexistence with ‘‘immoralists’’ (see Fig. 3 and
supplementary Video S3). Such immoralists are often called
‘‘sanctimonious’’ or blamed for ‘‘double moral standards’’, as they
defect themselves, while enforcing the cooperation of others (for the
purpose of exploitation). This is actually the main obstacle for the
spreading of immoralists, as they have to pay punishment costs,
while suffering from punishment fines as well. Therefore,
immoralists need small punishment costs c to survive. As
cooperators die out quickly for moderate values of r, the survival
of immoralists depends on the existence of moralists they can
exploit, otherwise they cannot outperform defectors. Conversely,
moralists benefit from immoralists by supporting the punishment of
defectors. Note, however, that this mutually profitable interaction
between moralists and immoralists, which appears like an ‘‘unholy
collaboration’’, is fragile: If b is increased, immoralists suffer from
fines, and if c is increased, punishing becomes too costly. In both
cases, immoralists die out, and the coexistence of moralists and
immoralists breaks down. Despite this fragility, ‘‘hypocritical’’
defectors, who punish other defectors, are known to occur in reality.
Their existence has even been found in experiments [34,35]. Here,
we have revealed conditions for their occurrence.
Discussion
In summary, the second-order free-rider problem finds a natural
and simple explanation, without requiring additional assumptions,
Figure 2. Elimination of second-order free-riders (non-punishing cooperators) in the spatial public goods game with costly
punishment for r~4:4, b~0:1, and ª~0:1. (a) Initially, at time t~0, cooperators (blue), defectors (red), moralists (green) and immoralists (yellow)
are uniformly distributed over the spatial lattice. (b) After a short time period (here, at t~10), defectors prevail. (c) After 100 iterations, immoralists
have almost disappeared, and cooperators prevail, since cooperators earn high payoffs when organized in clusters. (d) At t~500, there is a
segregation of moralists and cooperators, with defectors in between. (e) The evolutionary battle continues between cooperators and defectors on
the one hand, and defectors and moralists on the other hand (here at t~1000). (f) At t~2000, cooperators have been eliminated by defectors, and a
small fraction of defectors survives among a large majority of moralists. Interestingly, each strategy (apart from I) has a time period during which it
prevails, but only moralists can maintain their majority. While moralists perform poorly in the beginning, they are doing well in the end. We refer to
this as the ‘‘who laughs last laughs best’’ effect.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758.g002
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and punishment efforts are large enough. In fact, the presence of
spatial interactions can change the system behavior so dramati-
cally that we do not find the dominance of free-riders (defectors) as
in the case of well-mixed interactions, but a prevalence of moralists
via a ‘‘who laughs last laughs best’’ effect (Fig. 2). Moralists can
escape disadvantageous kinds of competition with cooperators by
spatial segregation. However, their triumph over all the other
strategies requires the temporary presence of defectors, who
diminish the cooperators (second-order free-riders). Finally,
moralists can take over, as they have reached a superiority over
cooperators (which is further growing) and as they can outcompete
defectors (conventional free-riders).
Our findings stress how crucial spatial or network interactions in
social systems are. Their consideration gives rise to a rich variety of
possible dynamics and a number of continuous or discontinuous
transitions between qualitatively different system behaviors. Spatial
interactions caneveninvertthe finallyexpected system behavior and,
thereby, explain a number of challenging puzzles of social,
economic, and biological systems. This includes the higher-than-
expected level of cooperation in social dilemma situations, the
elimination of second-order free-riders, and the formation of what
looks like a collaboration between otherwise inferior strategies.
By carefully scanning the parameter space, we found several
possible kinds of coexistence between two strategies each:
N Moralists (M) and defectors (D) can coexist, when the
disadvantage of cooperative behavior is not too large (i.e. the
synergy factor is high enough), and if the punishment fine is
sufficiently large that moralists can survive among defectors,
but not large enough to get rid of them.
N Instead of M and D, moralists (M) and immoralists (I) coexist,
when the punishment cost is small enough. The small
punishment cost is needed to ensure that the disadvantage of
punishing defectors (I) compared to non-punishing defectors
(D) is small enough that it can be compensated by the
additional punishment efforts contributed by moralists.
N To explain the well-known coexistence of D and C [11], it is
useful to remember that defectors can be crowded out by
cooperators, when the synergy factor exceeds a critical value
(even when punishment is not considered). Slightly below this
threshold, neither cooperators nor defectors have a sufficient
Figure 3. Coexistence of moralists and immoralists for r~3:5, b~0:12,a n dª~0:005, supporting the occurrence of individuals with
‘double moral standards’ (who punish defectors, while defecting themselves). (a) Initially, at time t~0, cooperators (blue), defectors
(red), moralists (green) and immoralists (yellow) are uniformly distributed over the spatial lattice. (b) After 250 iterations, cooperators have been
eliminated in the competition with defectors (as the synergy effect r of cooperation is not large enough), and defectors are prevailing. (c–e) The
snapshots at t~760, t~2250,a n dt~6000 show the interdependence of moralists and immoralists, which appears like a tacit collaboration. It is
visible that the two punishing strategies win the struggle with defectors by staying together. On the one hand, due to the additional punishment
cost, immoralists can survive the competition with defectors only by exploiting moralists. On the other hand, immoralists support moralists in
fighting defectors. (f) After 12000 iterations, defectors have disappeared completely, leading to a coexistence of clusters of moralists with
immoralists.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758.g003
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coexistence of both strategies.
Generally, a coexistence of strategies occurs, when the payoffs at
the interface between clusters of different strategies are balanced. In
order to understand why the coexistence is possible in a certain
parameter area rather than just for an infinitely small parameter set,
it is important to consider that typical cluster sizes vary with the
parameter values. This also changes the typical radius of the
interface between the coexisting strategies and, thereby, the typical
number of neighbors applying the same strategy or a different one.
Inotherwords,achangeintheshapeofaclustercanpartlycounter-
balance payoff differences between two strategies by varying the
number of ‘‘friends’’ and ‘‘enemies’’ involved in the battle at the
interface between spatial areas with different strategies (see Fig. 4).
Finally, we would like to discuss the robustness of our
observations. It is well-known that the level of cooperation in the
public goods game is highest in small groups [10]. However, we
have found that moralists can crowd out non-punishing cooper-
ators also for group sizes of kz1~9, 13, 21, or 25 interacting
individuals, for example. In the limiting case of large groups, where
everybody interacts with everybody else, we expect the outcome of
the well-mixed case, which corresponds to defection by everybody
(if other mechanisms like reputation effects [11] or abstaining are
not considered [20]). That is, the same mechanisms that can create
cooperation among friends may fail to establish shared moral
standards, when spatial interactions are negligible. It would
therefore be interesting to study, whether the fact that interactions
in the financial system are global, has contributed to the financial
crisis. Typically, when social communities exceed a certain size,
they need sanctioning institutions to stabilize cooperation (such as
laws, an executive system, and police).
Note that our principal discoveries are not expected to change
substantially for spatial interactions within irregular grids (i.e.
neighborhoods different from Moore neighborhoods) [47]. In case
of network interactions, we have checked that small-world or
random networks lead to similar results, when the degree
distribution is the same (see Fig. 5). A heterogeneous degree
distribution is even expected to reduce free-riding [37] (given the
average degree is the same). Finally, adding other cooperation-
promoting mechanisms to our model such as direct reciprocity (a
shadow of the future through repeated interactions [48]), indirect
reciprocity [17] (trust and reputation effects [11,18]), abstaining
from a joint enterprize [19–23], or success-driven migration [49],
Figure 4. Dependence of cluster shapes on the punishment fine b in the stationary state, supporting an adaptive balance between
the payoffs of two different strategies at the interface between competing clusters. Snapshots in the top row were obtained for low
punishment fines, while the bottom row depicts results obtained for higher values of b. (a) Coexistence of moralists and defectors for a synergy factor
r~3:5, punishment cost c~0:20, and punishment fine b~0:25. (b) Same parameters, apart from b~0:4. (c) Coexistence of moralists and immoralists
for r~3:5, c~0:05, and b~0:12. (d) Same parameters, apart from b~0:25. A similar change in the cluster shapes is found for the coexistence of
cooperators and defectors, if the synergy factor r is varied.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758.g004
Evolutionary Establishment of Moral…
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 6 April 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e1000758will strengthen the victory of moralists over conventional and
second-order free-riders.
In order to test the robustness of our observations, we have also
checked the effect of randomness (‘‘noise’’) originating from the
possibility of strategy mutations. It is known that mutations may
promote cooperation [50]. According to the numerical analysis of
the spatial public goods game with punishment, the introduction
of rare mutations does not significantly change the final outcome of
the competition between moralists and non-punishing cooperators.
Second-order free-riders will always be a negligible minority in the
end, if the fine-to-cost ratio and mutation rate allows moralists to
spread. While a large mutation rate naturally causes a uniform
distribution of strategies, a low level of strategy mutations can be
even beneficial for moralists. Namely, by permanently generating
a number of defectors, small mutation rates can considerably
accelerate the spreading of moralists, i.e. the slow logarithmic
coarsening is replaced by another kind of dynamics [51]. Defectors
created by mutations play the same role as in the DzM phase (see
Figs. 1+2). They put moralists into an advantage over non-
punishing cooperators, resulting in a faster spreading of the
moralists (which facilitates the elimination of second-order free-
riders over realistic time periods). In this way, the presence of a few
‘‘bad guys’’ (defectors) can accelerate the spreading of moral
standards. Metaphorically speaking, we call this ‘‘lucifer’s positive
side effect’’.
The current study paves the road for several interesting
extensions. It is possible, for example, to study antisocial
punishment [52], considering also strategies which punish
cooperators [53]. The conditions for the survival or spreading of
antisocial punishers can be identified by the same methodology, but
the larger number of strategies creates new phases in the
parameter space. While the added complexity transcends what
can be discussed here, the current study demonstrates clearly how
differentiated the moral dynamics in a society facing public goods
problems can be and how it depends on a variety of factors (such
as the punishment cost, punishment fine, and synergy factor).
Going one step further, evolutionary game theory may even prove
useful to understand how moral feelings have evolved.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate the emergence
of punishment within the framework of a coevolutionary model
[54–56], where both, individual strategies and punishment levels
are simultaneously spread. Such a model could, for example,
assume that individuals show some exploration behavior [50] and
stick to successful punishment levels for a long time, while they
quickly abandon unsuccessful ones. In the beginning of this
coevolutionary process, costly punishment would not pay off.
However, after a sufficiently long time, mutually fitting punish-
ment strategies are expected to appear in the same neighborhood
by coincidence [49]. Once an over-critical number of successful
punishment strategies have appeared in some area of the simulated
space, they are eventually expected to spread. The consideration
of success-driven migration should strongly support this process
[49]. Over many generations, genetic-cultural coevolution could
finally inherit costly punishment as a behavioral trait, as is
suggested by the mechanisms of strong reciprocity [57].
Methods
We study the public goods game with punishment. Cooperative
individuals (C and M) make a contribution of 1 to the public good,
while defecting individuals (D and I) contribute nothing. The sum
of all contributions is multiplied by r and the resulting amount
equally split among the kz1 interacting individuals. A defecting
individual (D or I) suffers a fine b=k by each punisher among the
interaction partners, and each punishment requires a punisher (M
or I) to spend a cost c=k on each defecting individual among the
interaction partners. In other words, only defectors and punishing
defectors (immoralists) are punished, and the overall punishment is
proportional to the sum of moralists and immoralists among the k
neighbors. The scaling by k serves to make our results comparable
with models studying different groups sizes.
Denoting the number of so defined cooperators, defectors,
moralists, and immoralists among the k interaction partners
by NC, ND, NM and NI, respectively, an individual obtains
the following payoff: If it is a cooperator, it gets
PC~r(NCzNMz1)=(kz1){1, if a defector, the payoff is
PD~r(NCzNM)=(kz1){b(NMzNI)=k, a moralist receives
PM~PC{c(NDzNI)=k, and an immoralist obtains
PI~PD{c(NDzNI)=k. Our model of the spatial variant of this
game studies interactions in a simple social network allowing for
clustering. It assumes that individuals are distributed on a square
lattice with periodic boundary conditions and play a public goods
game with k~4 neighbors. We work with a fully occupied lattice
of size L|L with L~200:::1200 in Fig. 1 and L~100 in Figs. 2–
4 (the lattice size must be large enough to avoid an accidental
extinction of a strategy). The initial strategies of the L2 individuals
are equally and uniformly distributed. Then, we perform a
random sequential update. The individual at the randomly chosen
location x belongs to five groups. (It is the focal individual of a
Moore neighborhood and a member of the Moore neighborhoods
of four nearest neighbors). It plays the public goods game with the
k interaction partners of a group g, and obtains a payoff Pg
x in all 5
groups it belongs to. The overall payoff is Px~
P
g Pg
x. Next, one
of the four nearest neighbors is randomly chosen. Its location shall
be denoted by y and its overall payoff by Py. This neighbor
imitates the strategy of the individual at location x with probability
q~1=f1zexp½(Py{Px)=K g [45]. That is, individuals tend to
imitate better performing strategies in their neighborhood, but
Figure 5. Resulting fractions of the four strategies C, D, I, and
M, for random regular graphs as a function of the punishment
fine b. The graphs were constructed by rewiring links of a square lattice
of size 400|400 with probability Q, thereby preserving the degree
distribution (i.e. every player has 4 nearest neighbors) [59]. For small
values of Q, small-world properties result, while for Q?1, we have a
random regular graph. By keeping the degree distribution fixed, we can
study the impact of randomness in the network structure indepen-
dently of other effects. An inhomogeneous degree distribution can
further promote cooperation [37]. The results displayed here are
averages over 10 simulation runs for the model parameters r~3:5,
c~0:05, and Q~0:99. Similar results can be obtained also for other
parameter combinations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758.g005
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[31]. Realistic noise levels lie between the two extremes K?0
(corresponding to unconditional imitation by the neighbor,
whenever the overall payoff Px is higher than Py) and K??
(where the strategy is copied with probability 1/2, independently
of the payoffs). For the noise level K~0:5 chosen in our study, the
evolutionary selection pressure is high enough to eventually
eliminate poorly performing strategies in favor of strategies with a
higher overall payoff. This implies that the resulting frequency
distribution of strategies in a large enough lattice is independent of
the specific initial condition after a sufficiently long transient time.
Close to the separating line between M and D+M in Fig. 1, the
equilibration may require up to 107 iterations (involving L2
updates each).
Supporting Information
Video S1 Indirect territorial battle between cooperators (blue)
and moralists (green) in the presence of defectors (red). The
computer simulation of the public goods game with punishment is
performed for a grid of size LxL=1006100, where the synergy
factor of cooperation is r=4.4, the punishment fine b=0.1, and
the punishment cost is c=0.1. For a detailed discussion of the
spatiotemporal dynamics see the main text, particularly Fig. 2.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758.s001 (4.26 MB AVI)
Video S2 Temporal evolution of the coexistence between
defectors (red) and cooperators (blue) for the parameter values
r=4.4, b=0.1, and c=0.3.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758.s002 (4.90 MB AVI)
Video S3 Coexistence of moralists (green) and immoralists
(yellow), who jointly defeat defectors (red). The computer
simulation is performed for a grid of size LxL=1006100, where
the synergy factor of cooperation is r=3.5, the punishment fine is
b=0.12, and the punishment cost is c=0.005. For a detailed
discussion of the spatiotemporal dynamics see the main text,
particularly Fig. 3.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758.s003 (9.99 MB AVI)
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